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I. INTRODUCTION
Capital mobility has a singular importance in the American
economy.1 This is particularly critical in the context of successorship
doctrine, in which an ongoing business enterprise is acquired by
another business. A fundamental tension exists between the rights of
the buyers and sellers of the company, on one side of the equation,
and the rights of the employees of the company, on the other side.
This conflict between entrepreneurial flexibility and stable employ-
ment conditions is central to labor law.2
The resolution of this conflict is confounded by a myriad of ques-
tions and potential answers: When management decides that a com-
pany will be sold to another, are any rights automatically retained by
the labor force? Can the labor force prevent the sale or transfer,
either by statutory or contract rights? Can an acquiring company be
forced to assume a collective bargaining agreement as a condition of
the sale? Must it continue to employ the same labor force or can it
hire a new set of employees? If the workers are retained, is the former
collective bargaining agreement automatically assumed, or is there
merely a duty to arbitrate differences? If a collective bargaining
1. Silverstein, The Fate of Workers in Successor Firms: Does Law Tame the Market?, 8
INDUS. REL. L.J. 153, 174 (1986).
2. Id. at 156.
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agreement is not assumed, is there nevertheless a duty to bargain with
workers that are retained or hired as new employees? Under what
circumstances may a company that sells its business nevertheless
remain liable to its former employees for damages, wages, or benefits?
The answers to these questions impact directly on the value of a com-
pany, and correspondingly on the ability of the owners of a company
to sell or otherwise transfer the company, and in effect, their capital.
The critical forum for resolving the conflict, and answering these
questions, is arbitration, the primary means of dispute resolution in
labor relations.3 Arbitrators, in their interpretation of a collective
bargaining agreement, often must attempt to balance the need of man-
agement to make changes in the operation of a company against the
rights and entitlements that the employees believe have been negoti-
ated into the collective bargaining agreement in exchange for other
concessions. This Comment examines the way in which arbitrators
make these decisions in the doctrinal area of successorship, and the
values they express in doing so. Section II explores both how the
Supreme Court has defined the concept of successorship, and how the
values expressed by the Court concerning the free flow of capital
underlie its decisions. Section III reviews arbitration decisions in an
effort to ascertain the way in which arbitrators apply the doctrine in
individual cases. Section IV analyzes the patterns of values and
processes that emerge from these arbitral decisions. Finally, Section
V concludes that although there may be an underlying assumption
concerning the necessity of capital mobility and entrepreneurial flexi-
bility, particularly in what is categorized as predecessor cases, this
assumption is often left unstated in arbitration opinions. Accord-
ingly, arbitrators most often rely on Supreme Court doctrine, prior
arbitrations, and the negotiating positions and past practice of the
parties in an attempt to ground their opinions within a narrow range
3. See Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L.
REV. 663 (1973); see also Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE
L.J. 1509, 1523-25, 1528-29 (1981).
The Supreme Court has long recognized, and continually affirmed, the special role of
arbitration in labor-management disputes. There is generally great deference to arbitrations:
Courts will rarely review or overturn an arbitral decision. The Court originally set out the
doctrine of deference to labor arbitration in the series of cases known as the Steelworkers
Trilogy. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). For a more recent affirmation of
these principles, see AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643
(1986). For a discussion of judicial deference to arbitrators, see generally Note, Judicial
Deference to Grievance Arbitration in the Private Sector: Saving Grace in the Search for a Well-
Defined Public Policy Exception, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 767 (1988).
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of principles and rationales that ensure the continued perception of
the fairness and reasonableness of arbitration.
II. SUCCESSORSHIP DOCTRINE: THE SUPREME
COURT'S FOUNDATION
The doctrine of successorship evolved in a series of United States
Supreme Court cases that revolved around a successor employer's
duty to bargain or arbitrate disputes with a union representing the
employees of a predecessor employer.4 The cases are primarily
important because of the definition of successor that has evolved from
them. However, they are also valuable because of the underlying
views expressed by the Court concerning the free flow of capital in a
market economy. Although the Court recently modified the doctrine,5
this Section discusses the cases upon which arbitrators have relied in
formulating the decisions that are reviewed in Section III of this
Comment.
A. The Duty to Arbitrate: John Wiley & Sons
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston6 was the first significant
successorship doctrine case decided by the Court. In Wiley, Inter-
science Publishers, Inc., merged with the much larger John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., and ceased to do business as a separate entity.7 The union
that represented the employees of Interscience argued that it contin-
ued to represent the employees who were hired by Wiley, and that
Wiley was obligated to recognize certain rights of these employees
that had been negotiated into the collective bargaining agreement
with Interscience, the former employer. Wiley refused to recognize
the union, asserting that the merger terminated the previous bargain-
ing agreement and any rights based on the agreement, such as an obli-
gation to arbitrate disputes.' The parties were unable to resolve these
4. However, as will be seen in Section III of this Comment, many of the successorship
doctrine arbitrations have very little, if anything to do with the duty to bargain or arbitrate.
5. See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987); infra notes 69
& 80 (reviewing Fall River and its possible implications for successor doctrine arbitration).
6. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
7. Id. at 545. The former Interscience employees were merged into the larger unit of
John Wiley employees. Id. There was no express provision in the contract between the union
and Interscience binding successors or assigns. Interscience Encyclopedia, Inc., 55 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 210, 211 (1970) (Roberts, Arb.). Before and after the merger, the union representing
forty of the eighty Interscience employees attempted to negotiate with both Interscience and
Wiley over the rights of the unionized Interscience employees. Wiley, 376 U.S. at 545. No
agreement was reached, however, as to the effect of the merger on those employees represented
by the union that were hired by Wiley. Id.
8. Wiley, 376 U.S. at 545.
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disputes on their own and the union commenced a suit to compel
arbitration 9 under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act (LMRA).' ° The district court refused relief," but the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ordered that the dis-
pute be submitted to arbitration.' 2
The United States Supreme Court held that, even though Wiley
had not been a party to the collective bargaining agreement between
the union and Interscience, it was still bound by the arbitration provi-
sion contained in the agreement.' 3 The Court noted that, although
principles of law ordinarily do not bind an unconsenting successor to
a contract, a collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary con-
tract. 14 The Court stated that impressive national labor policy consid-
erations favoring arbitration 5 take precedence over the fact that
Wiley did not sign the agreement being construed. 6
The Court noted that the duty to arbitrate would not necessarily
survive in every case in which the ownership or the corporate struc-
9. Id. at 546.
10. Ch. 120, tit. I, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-200 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986)). The Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) applies to employees in
private industries that affect interstate commerce. Section 301 provides that:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce... may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
11. Livingston v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), rev'd, 313
F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1963), aff'd, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
12. Livingston v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 313 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1963), aff'd, 376 U.S. 543
(1964).
13. Wiley, 376 U.S. at 550.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); see also supra note 3. The Wiley
Court noted the preference of arbitration as a substitute for tests of strength between
contending forces. Wiley, 376 U.S. at 549. The Court stated the objectives of national labor
policy as follows:
The objectives of national labor policy, reflected in established principles of
federal law, require that the rightful prerogative of owners independently to
rearrange their business, and even eliminate themselves as employers be balanced
by some protection to the employees from a sudden change in the employment
relationship. The transition from one corporate organization to another will in
most cases be eased and industrial strife avoided if employees' claims continue to
be resolved by arbitration rather than by "the relative strength . . . of the
contending forces."
Id.
16. Wiley, 376 U.S. at 550.
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ture of an enterprise is changed.' 7 In order to determine whether the
duty to arbitrate may be imposed on a successor company, the Court
established a test of "substantial continuity of identity in the business
enterprise."' 8 Wiley was therefore obligated to arbitrate the claims of
the former Interscience employees because there had been a wholesale
transfer of employees from Interscience to Wiley, apparently without
difficulty. 19 The Court explicitly stated that it would not suggest any
view on whether, in all circumstances, a union has a right to continue
as certified representative for employees following a change in
ownership.2"
B. The Duty to Bargain: NLRB v. Burns
The Supreme Court examined the issue of continued union repre-
sentation in the successor doctrine context in NLRB v. Burns Interna-
tional Security Services, Inc.2" Burns arose, not in an arbitration
context, but rather in an unfair labor practices action brought under
Subsections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(2) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act ("NLRA" or "Act"). 22 Burns had successfully bid on a
contract to provide security services to Lockheed Aircraft Services
Co. 23 These security services previously had been provided by Wack-
17. Id. at 551.
18. Id.
19. Id. The former Interscience employees' claims were eventually arbitrated.
Interscience Encyclopedia, Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 210 (1970) (Roberts, Arb.). The
arbitrator decided that Wiley had to- recognize seniority rights built up by the former
Interscience employees, but only until the date that they actually were transferred from the
former Interscience location to the Wiley plant, when they were to be considered merged into
the larger Wiley workforce. Id. at 225. Similarly, there were no continuing obligations for
contributions to the union pension and thrift plans once the former Interscience employees
moved into the Wiley premises and their separate identity ceased. Id. at 225-26.
20. Wiley, 376 U.S. at 551. None of the Wiley employees previously had been represented
by a union, and they far outnumbered the former Interscience employees performing similar
work after the merger. Id. at 545. The Court later addressed the issue of continued
representation in the context of the duty to bargain. See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc.,
406 U.S. 272 (1972); see also infra notes 21-41 and accompanying text.
21. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
22. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986)).
Section 8(a)(1) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ...to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 157
of this title." NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
Section 8(a)(2) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ...to
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or
contribute financial or other support to it." NLRA § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2).
Section 8(a)(5) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ...to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the
provisions of section 159(a) of this title." NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
23. Burns, 406 U.S. at 275.
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enhut Corp. Burns hired some of the former Wackenhut guards who
were represented by a union-the United Plant Guard Workers of
America (UPG)-and informed them that to keep working they
would have to join a rival union, the American Federation of Guards
(AFG).24 The UPG then filed unfair labor practice charges with the
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board"). 25 The
Board found that Burns had violated Subsections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(2), and
8(a)(5) of the NLRA26 by unlawfully assisting the AFG and by failing
to bargain with the UPG or honor the collective bargaining agree-
ment that previously had been negotiated between Wackenhut and
the union.27 On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit upheld the finding of unlawful assistance of a rival
union and refusal to bargain, and held that the NLRB had exceeded
its authority in ordering Burns to honor the contract that had been
negotiated with Wackenhut. 28 Both Burns and the Board petitioned
for certiorari, with both petitions being granted.29
The Supreme Court took this opportunity to distinguish its Wiley
decision.3" The Court adopted the Board's finding that the bargaining
unit determination was correct, and held that Burns was obligated to
bargain with the UPG as the collective bargaining representative of
the guards. 31 A change in either ownership or management, the
Court reasoned, was not sufficient to upset the Board's recognition of
the UPG as collective bargaining representative when a majority of
the workers after the change in ownership or management had been
24. Id. Shortly before the contract with Lockheed was due to expire, the security guards'
union, the United Plant Guard Workers of America (UPG), had been certified by the NLRB
as bargaining representative for the guards. Id. at 274. Lockheed informed Burns and all
other potential bidders for the next security services contract that the guards currently on their
premises, although in the actual employ of Wackenhut, were represented by a union. Id. at
275. Burns nevertheless entered a bid for the contract that was accepted. Burns subsequently
chose to retain twenty-seven of the Wackenhut guards and brought in fifteen of its own guards
from other facilities to service the Lockheed plant. Id. Burns intended to treat the bargaining
unit as part of a larger bargaining unit, the American Federation of Guards (AFG), composed
of guards at different locations in the same general geographic area for which Burns provided
security services, and with whom Burns had a collective bargaining agreement. Id.
25. Id. at 276.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see supra note 22.
27. Burns, 406 U.S. at 276.
28. Id. at 276-77; see William J. Bums Int'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d
911 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd sub nom. NLRB v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
29. Burns, 406 U.S. at 277. Burns challenged both the unit determination and the
bargaining order. The Board maintained its position that Burns was bound by the prior
collective bargaining agreement with Wackenhut. Id. Although certiorari was granted for
both petitions, the Court declined to review the propriety of the bargaining unit, accepting the
Board's determination as correct. Id.
30. Id. at 285-88.
31. Id. at 278-79.
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employed by the predecessor in the original bargaining unit. 32 The
Court implied, however, that its ruling might be different if an appre-
ciable difference in the operational structure and practices of Burns
and Wackenhut existed, or if Burns had not hired employees who
already were represented by a certified union.
33
The Court stated that Wiley was not controlling on the issue of
whether Burns was bound to the contract negotiated between Wack-
enhut and the union. 34 The Court distinguished the Wiley situation,
finding that an action to compel arbitration differed from an unfair
labor practice proceeding.35 In Burns, unlike the situation in Wiley,
there was no sale or merger of corporate assets, and no direct contact
between the supposed predecessor, Wackenhut, and the supposed suc-
cessor, Burns.36 Although Burns had taken over a bargaining unit
that was largely intact, and thus had a duty to bargain with it, the
Court found little basis for implying that Burns also had agreed to
honor the collective bargaining agreement that previously had been
negotiated between the bargaining unit and the prior employer. Thus,
Burns was not obligated to assume the prior contract.37
The Court also advanced an economic rationale for its holding,
arguing that serious inequities could result if either a new employer or
the union was bound to the substantive terms of the former collective
bargaining agreement.38 In one of the more significant passages in
successorship doctrine, the Court stated:
A potential employer may be willing to take over a moribund busi-
ness only if he can make changes in corporate structure, composi-
tion of the labor force, work location, task assignment, and nature
of supervision. Saddling such an employer with the terms and con-
ditions of employment contained in the old collective-bargaining
contract may make these changes impossible and may discourage
32. Id. at 279-80. The Court also noted that it may not be clear when the successor's duty
to bargain actually begins. Id. at 295. Until such time as a "full complement" of employees
are hired, the duty to bargain with the bargaining representative may not mature, as it may not
be evident until then that union workers constitute a majority of the workforce. Id. This "full
complement" rule was also an important issue in Fall River. See Fall River Dyeing &
Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987).
33. Burns, 406 U.S. at 280. The Court later addressed the successorship doctrine issues
that arise when employees of the predecessor are not hired by the successor in Howard
Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974). See infra notes 51-64
and accompanying text.
34. 406 U.S. at 285.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 286.
37. Id. at 287.
38. Id.
1989]
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and inhibit the transfer of capital.39
The Court further stated that a union also may suffer inequities if it
had made concessions to an economically distressed employer that it
might not have made to a larger or more economically successful
firm.' Finally, the Court noted that congressional policy embodied
in the NLRA enables both labor and management to negotiate for
any protection either might deem appropriate, but at the same time
allows the bargaining advantage to be set by economic power
realities.41
C. Liability for the Predecessor's Unfair Labor Practices:
Golden State
Unfair labor practices, rather than arbitration, were at issue in
Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 42 in which the Court held a suc-
cessor company liable for an obligation of its predecessor. In Golden
State, a wrongfully discharged employee brought an action that
resulted in an NLRB order of reinstatement and backpay. 43 After the
Board decision, but before a hearing to determine the amount of
backpay due to the employee, the company was acquired by a succes-
sor who was aware of the litigation and the NLRB order.44 The
Board then ordered the successor to reinstate the employee, and
found the predecessor and successor jointly and severally liable for
the backpay.45 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit enforced the order.46 The Supreme Court held that the Board's
order applied to the successor company. 47 The Court reaffirmed the
rationale it had stated in Wiley for recognizing the special nature of
contract principles in the labor law context: Rights of owners to rear-
range their business must be balanced against protection for the
39. Id. at 287-88. Professor Silverstein notes that although the failing company example
has surface appeal, it has no particular relevance to Burns. Silverstein, supra note 1, at 167 &
n.61. Although it may be common sense to avoid the business failure of an ailing company by
freeing a successor from the contractual obligations of the predecessor, in Burns the Court was
not dealing with a moribund business whose marketability depended on the ability of a
successor to restructure the operation. Id. Any impact on restructuring opportunities or
capital mobility was speculative at best. Id.
40. Burns, 406 U.S. at 287-88.
41. Id. at 288.
42. 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
43. Id. at 170.
44. Id. at 171.
45. Id. at 172; see Golden State Bottling Co., 187 N.L.R.B. 1017 (1971), afl'd, 467 F.2d
164 (9th Cir. 1972), afJ'd, 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
46. 467 F.2d 164, 166 (9th Cir. 1972).
47. Golden State, 414 U.S. at 179.
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employees.48 The Court recognized that although generally a pur-
chaser is not responsible for a seller's liabilities unless agreed to, or
unless the purchaser merely continues in the seller's business, in the
context of labor law successorship doctrine this rule will not be nar-
rowly construed. 49 Although in this instance the purchaser commit-
ted no unfair labor practice, the Court nevertheless held that the
purchaser could be held liable as successor for the back pay due the
discharged employee because it had acquired the predecessor with full
knowledge of the NLRB order.5"
D. Remedies from the Predecessor: Howard Johnson
The most recent Supreme Court decision on which arbitrators
have relied for successorship doctrine is Howard Johnson Co. v.
Detroit Local Joint Executive Board.51 In Howard Johnson, as in
Wiley, the Court was again faced with an action to compel a successor
company to arbitrate.5 2 Howard Johnson purchased the assets of a
restaurant and motel from sellers who were Howard Johnson fran-
chisees.53 Howard Johnson contracted for the purchase with knowl-
edge that the sellers had union contracts, but stated that it would not
recognize or assume any of the labor agreements between the sellers
and any labor organization, nor would it assume any liabilities of the
sellers arising from any labor agreements.54 By refusing to recognize
the union or the labor contracts, Howard Johnson contravened
clauses in the collective bargaining agreements between the sellers and
the unions that provided that the agreements would bind successors.55
The union then instituted an action seeking to compel Howard
Johnson and the seller to arbitrate the extent of their obligations to
48. Id. at 182 (citing John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964)); see
also supra note 15.
49. Golden State, 414 U.S. at 182 n.5.
50. Id. at 184-85.
51. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
52. Id. at 252-53.
53. Id. at 250-51.
54. Id. at 251-52.
55. Id. at 251. Two weeks before the transfer of control, the sellers notified all employees
that their employment would be terminated as of the date of transfer. Id. at 252. Howard
Johnson, as purchaser, also notified the unions that it would not recognize the unions nor
assume any of the pre-existing obligations under the labor agreements between the unions and
the sellers. Id. Howard Johnson then placed advertisements in local newspapers seeking new
employees, so that when it actually commenced operating the facility, only nine of its 45
employees had previously been employed by the predecessor sellers. Of these nine, none were
supervisory personnel. Id.
1989]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the employees of the seller. 6 Both the district court" and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit58 relied on Wiley in
ordering Howard Johnson to arbitrate.
The Supreme Court, however, distinguished Wiley as not being
applicable. Wiley involved a merger in which the original employer
disappeared as a separate entity, while Howard Johnson involved a
partial sale of assets, in which the original employer remained in exist-
ence as a viable corporate entity.59 The sellers in Howard Johnson
thus remained available as a target for arbitration to consider whether
the successorship provisions of the collective bargaining agreement
had been breached, and what remedy, if any, might be available under
the terms of the agreement between the sellers and the union."
The Court emphasized that, unlike Wiley, in which all of the
predecessor's employees were given the opportunity to continue work-
ing, and unlike Burns, in which a majority of the new employees had
worked for the predecessor, Howard Johnson had selected and hired
its own independent workforce.6 The Court relied on Burns as estab-
lishing that Howard Johnson had the right not to hire any of the
employees of the predecessor management.62 Thus, the Court held
that because there was "no substantial continuity of identity in the
workforce... and no express or implied assumption of the agreement
to arbitrate,"63 the successor employer did not have to arbitrate the
extent of its obligations to the former employees of the predecessor
employer. 64
56. Id. The action originally was filed in state court but was removed to federal court as
the grounds for the action were under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.
LMRA §301, 29 U.S.C. § 185; see supra note 10.
57. Detroit Local Joint Executive Rd. v. Howard Johnson Co., 81 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2329
(E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd, 482 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
58. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd. v. Howard Johnson Co., 482 F.2d 489 (6th Cir.
1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
59. Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257-58.
60. Id. The Court also noted that the unions could have, in the alternative, moved to
enjoin the sale. Id. at 258 n.3; see, e.g., Local Lodge No. 1266, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v.
Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1981) (upheld status quo injunction preventing sale
of business pending arbitration); see also infra note 98.
61. Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 259. It is important to emphasize that the action seeking
arbitration was not for the benefit of the employees who were hired by Howard Johnson, but
rather was for the benefit of those former employees who were not. Id. at 260.
62. Id. at 262. This interpretation of Burns has been strongly criticized as opening the
door for successor employers to avoid obligations towards the employees of their predecessor.
See, e.g., Severson & Wilcoxon, Successorship Under Howard Johnson: Short Order Justice for
Employees, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 795 (1976).
63. Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 264.
64. The Court seemed to recognize the somewhat muddled state of successorship doctrine
by explaining its holding in a footnote. Id. at 262 n.9. The Court limited its holding solely to
the issue of whether Howard Johnson could be compelled to arbitrate over the former
[Vol. 44:403
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E. Successorship Doctrine and Capital Mobility
The Supreme Court has shaped the parameters of successorship
doctrine on two levels. First, on the more overt of these levels, the
Court has developed doctrine that defines the concept of successor-
ship. Second, on a more subtle level, the Court has influenced succes-
sorship doctrine through its expositions on the free flow of capital in
the American economy. At its most basic level, successorship doc-
trine stands for the proposition that arbitration may be compelled
against a successor employer following a merger if there is substantial
continuity of identity in the business enterprise.65 In addition, if a
successor employer hires a majority of its work force from among the
seller's employees, the purchaser is obligated to bargain with the
union that represents the seller's employees, despite no concomitant
obligation to assume the collective bargaining agreement between the
union and the predecessor seller.66 A successor can be obligated for
the liabilities arising from a predecessor's unfair labor practices under
the NLRA when the acquisition of the predecessor is made with
knowledge of the potential liabilities.67 Finally, a successor does not
have to arbitrate over obligations to former employees of the prede-
cessor when a new work force is hired.6" Although the Court recently
has added another major case to the successorship doctrine, Fall River
Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB,69 the effects of that decision are
employees in the circumstances of the case. Id. It expressly did not decide whether Howard
Johnson could be considered a successor employer for any other purpose. Id. The Court
noted that "[t]here is, and can be, no single definition of 'successor' which is applicable in
every legal context. A new employer, in other words, may be a successor for some purposes
and not for others." Id.
65. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). Although the continued
viability of the substantial continuity test as a factor in compelling arbitration has been
questioned, it remains an important test used by arbitrators in defining successorship.
66. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
67. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
68. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
69. 482 U.S. 27 (1987). Fall River concerned the duty of a potential successor to bargain
with a union following the failure of a textile dyeing business and an attempt to resurrect, not
the company, but the plant itself. A new company, Fall River, acquired the physical plant and
equipment from the creditors, and remaining inventory at public auction. Id. at 32. There was
no purchase of a trade name, good will, or customer lists. Id. at 57. Workers were hired
through advertisements in local newspapers. Id. at 32-33.
Less than two months after beginning operations, the union requested that Fall River
recognize it as the bargaining agent for the employees. Id. at 33. The company refused the
request. Id. One year after Fall River began operations, the union filed an unfair labor
practices charge with the NLRB. Id. at 34. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that Fall
River was a successor to the prior owner, Sterlingwale, and therefore had a duty to bargain
with the union. Id. at 34-35. This order was affirmed by both the Board and the United States
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yet to be reflected in arbitrations.7 °
On the more subtle and complex level of successorship doctrine
lies the Court's economic vision of the effects of its decisions on the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 272
N.L.R.B. 839 (1984), aff'd, 775 F.2d 425 (1st Cir. 1985), aff'd, 482 U.S. 27 (1987).
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Fall River was a successor to the former textile
plant and therefore was under a duty to bargain with the union that had represented the
workers of the predecessor. Fall River, 482 U.S. at 41. The Court held that when a union has
a rebuttable presumption of majority status, the status continues despite a change in employers
so long as the new employer is, in fact, a successor to the prior employer. Id. This constitutes
an expansion of the doctrine in Burns thatothere was a presumption of continued
representation because the union had only recently been certified. Id. at 36-38. The Court
applied essentially the substantial continuity test to decide that Fall River was a successor to
Sterlingwale. Id. at 43-46. Although there had been a seven month hiatus between the
operations of Sterlingwale and Fall River, the Court held that this was now only one of the
factors to be considered in the substantial continuity calculus. Id. at 45. In addition, the
Court dismissed as irrelevant the fact that there were no direct dealings between Fall River
and Sterlingwale. Id. at 44 n.10. How a successor obtains a predecessor's assets generally is
not determinative of the substantial continuity question. Id. The Court also found persuasive
the fact that Fall River specifically was formed to take advantage of the labor and physical
plant of Sterlingwale. Id. at 44 & n. 10.
Having decided that Fall River was a successor to Sterlingwale, the Court then examined
exactly when the duty to bargain arose. Id. at 46-52. In Burns, the Court held that the duty
arose when a "full complement" was hired. See Burns, 406 U.S at 294-95. The Fall River
Court, however, now stated that Burns was not to be read as defining "full complement" to
mean when the employer has hired all the employees it intends to employ. Fall River, 482 U.S.
at 47 n. 14. The Court held that the duty to bargain arises when a "substantial and
representative complement" of employees has been hired. Id. at 52. Thus, the duty to bargain
may arise before all employees are hired.
Fall River, therefore, extends several elements of the successorship doctrine as it relates to
the duty to bargain. It is now apparent that a hiatus in operations between a predecessor and a
possible successor will not disqualify a finding of successorship. Id. at 45. In addition, there
no longer seems to be any necessity for a finding of direct dealing between the predecessor and
the successor. Id. at 43-44. Finally, Burns has been modified on two fronts: The requirement
of a "full complement" of workers has been extended to a "substantial complement"; and the
union has a rebuttable presumption of majority status that is not limited to the special Burns
situation in which the union had been certified just before the change in employers. Id. at 47-
52.
The Court's decision in Fall River certainly will have an effect on both judicial and
arbitral forums. By extending the substantial continuity doctrine, potential successors are
likely to be found, both in the courts, and in arbitrations, to be "successors." The "substantial
and representative complement" rule also places added pressure on potential successor
employers. Will they now avoid successorship problems altogether by following the doctrine
of Howard Johnson and not hiring any employees of a predecessor?
The most probable impact on arbitrators will be in those situations requiring a
determination of whether a new employer is a successor. As reviewed in Section III of this
Comment, arbitrators often use the doctrine as a foundation upon which to lay their own
views. Fall River, by extending the definition of what constitutes a successor, will thus give
arbitrators even more leeway to find that an employer is a successor when there is no direct
dealing between the supposed predecessor and successor. See, e.g., Little Rose Coal Co., 85
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1103 (1985) (Feldman, Arb.).
70. See infra note 82.
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transfer of capital.71 In analyzing the successorship cases, it is appar-
ent that the Court does not want federal labor policy to inhibit the
free flow of capital. This is seen as particularly critical when a pur-
chaser is willing to revamp and revitalize a weak enterprise by making
changes that will increase profitability and the economic health of the
enterprise.72 In order to protect this core value of capital mobility,
the Court has retreated from the initial implications of Wiley that a
purchaser might be bound by the collective bargaining agreement of a
seller without having affirmatively assumed the agreement. 73 Unless
the transfer is a merger, with the original party that signed the collec-
tive bargaining agreement being swallowed by the surviving entity, a
purchaser will not be obligated to assume the terms of the predeces-
sor's collective bargaining agreement.74
When a company has agreed to a successor clause but nonethe-
less has sold the business without forcing the purchaser to assume or
recognize the agreement, the only recourse left to the union is an
action against the predecessor seller. In this circumstance, arbitration
assumes a key position in the resolution of the dispute. The central
question in the arbitral forum becomes whether the successor lan-
guage has actually been bargained for, with the union accepting the
clause in lieu of higher wages or other benefits. If so, the clause
should be enforceable by either an injunction or by an award of dam-
ages, as the successor clause language should logically affect the trans-
fer price of the company.75
In addressing the core issue in Burns of whether there was a duty
to bargain, the Court also discussed the issue of transfer of capital.
The duty to bargain is a much more limited constraint on the transfer
of capital than the duty to arbitrate or otherwise assume a collective
bargaining agreement. 76 Although a duty to bargain may exist, the
successor employer may set initial employment terms in accordance
with the real market for wages and benefits, rather than rely on the
71. This also may inform the decisions of arbitrators, but not as overtly as in the Court
decisions. See infra Sections III and IV.
72. Burns, 406 U.S. at 287-88.
73. See id. at 287 (The hiring of Wackenhut employees "is a wholly insufficient basis for
implying either in fact or in law that Burns had agreed or must be held to have agreed to honor
Wackenhut's collective-bargaining contract.").
74. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 257
(1974).
75. See, e.g., Marley-Wylain Co., 87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8293 (1987)
(Jacobowski, Arb.) (damages and back pay to be determined when company sold without
successor assuming collective bargaining agreement); Sexton's Steak House, Inc., 76 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 576 (1981) (Ross, Arb.) (arbitrator enjoins completion of sale to purchaser who refuses
to be bound by collective bargaining agreement).
76. See Burns, 406 U.S. at 287-91.
1989]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
prior collective bargaining agreement." The prior collective bargain-
ing agreement is not a constraint on the transfer unless it is volunta-
rily accepted by the purchaser. 7  Assuming that the contract is not
accepted, the new employer must bargain as a result of hiring the
employees of the predecessor.7 9 The value of the employees' organi-
zation is protected while the employer gets the value of a trained and
available work force and the ability to set or negotiate new terms of
employment.
77. This is particularly relevant when an attempt is made to revitalize a business. See Fall
River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987); see also supra note 69 and
infra note 80. However, once the employees accept unfavorable terms in order to keep their
jobs, how likely are they to strike in order to regain their prior benefits? See Silverstein, supra
note 1, at 164. But see Martin Podany Assocs., 84-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8469 (1984)
(Gallagher, Arb.) (Arbitrator awarded damages and back pay to be paid by predecessor to
employees who went on strike against successor, with successor subsequently closing
business.); Martin Podany Assocs., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 658 (1983) (Gallagher, Arb.).
78. See Burns, 406 U.S. at 280 n.5; see also Comment, Merging the RLA and the NLRA for
Eastern Air Lines: Can It Fly?, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539, 588 (1989).
79. However, because the duty to bargain depends on whether the employees are hired by
the new employer, the bargaining power of the employees is low. Following Howard Johnson,
the new employer need not hire the employees of the predecessor. Howard Johnson Co. v.
Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 262, 264 (1974). Therefore, if the new
employer is inclined to believe that the employees of the predecessor may be too demanding,
the duty to bargain may be avoided merely by not hiring those employees. See Comment, The
Unenforceable Successorship Clause: A Departure from National Labor Policy, 30 UCLA L.
REV. 1249, 1251 (1983); see also Silverstein, supra note 1, at 164. Professor Silverstein notes
the constraints on employers provided by market forces that operate to protect incumbent
employees:
Presumably, a successor will not turn a profitable wallet manufacturing plant
into an unproven shoe production facility to avoid imposition of the duty to
arbitrate; nor will a successor continue a marginal operation unchanged solely to
secure the beneficial terms of its predecessor's contract. Employee interests in
continued employment on favorable terms are recognized, but the security of the
workers, like that of the enterprise, is tied to the strength of the acquired business
in the market.
Id. at 161.
80. The Court's decision in Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27
(1987), concerned a successor's duty to bargain. By extending the definition of successor, the
Court may have acted counter to its interest in the free flow and transfer of capital. See Burns,
406 U.S. at 287-88 (The binding of a new employer to the former collective bargaining
agreement may make organizational changes impossible and discourage and inhibit the
transfer of capital.). This dilemma cannot be easily resolved. At the time that the predecessor,
Sterlingwale, began operations, Massachusetts was one of the leading textile producing areas of
the United States. Today, the textile industry in the area is moribund, a victim of changing
economic conditions. Textile production has moved to other, non-unionized areas of this
country, or simply out of this country, to developing nations in the Far East. See Fall River,
482 U.S. at 30-31. In Burns, the Court was concerned with preventing the discouragement of
the transfer of capital. Fall River, however, is not about the transfer of capital per se, but
rather about investment, and an attempt to revive a struggling industry in a depressed
geographic area. By making it easier for a purchasing company to be found to be a successor,
the Court's decision in Fall River may well inhibit the investment of capital in attempts to
revitalize dying or struggling industries in which there are trained and available union
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As the primary means of dispute resolution in labor relations,
arbitration thus has become the focal point regarding the capacity and
ability of unions to obtain a clause guaranteeing wages and other
working conditions when transfers of businesses and capital are
made.8 1  The enforceability of these successor clauses may directly
impact on the value of the business being sold. The following analysis
of arbitrations attempts to discern how arbitrators have used and
applied both levels of successorship doctrine in resolving disputes
between unions and sellers or purchasers of a business enterprise."2
workforces. This would seem to run counter to the Court's professed interest in the free flow
and transfer of capital.
In the alternative, the Court, by stretching the definition of successor, recognized the
value to a new employer of a trained and available workforce as well as the value to employees
of union organization. Further, the impact of Fall River on a successor may be limited because
the Court imposed only a duty to bargain, rather than a contractual obligation that would bind
a new employer to the former collective bargaining agreement. Those employees that are hired
must accept work at the terms offered by the successor. Therefore, following Fall River, a
successor still has the ability to reduce wages, change work rules, or substitute technology
unhindered by the collective bargaining agreement, in an effort to improve efficiency.
The outer boundary and ultimate expansion of the Fall River holding would be to find a
duty to bargain in a situation in which a new enterprise, with a new plant and facilities, is set
up in a location precisely because there were unemployed, yet trained workers of a stagnant
industry, and those formerly organized workers are hired. In that case, there would be a duty
to bargain even if there were no contact of any nature between the new enterprise and the
defunct company. Such an application of Fall River would seem to be in accordance with the
hint of at least one commentator that employees may have an expectation against employers in
the employing industry. See Friedman & Griesbach, Labor Law Issues in Plant Acquisitions,
37 PROC. N.Y.U. ANN. NAT'L CONF. ON LABOR § 7, at 7-32 (1984). In his dissent in Fall
River, Justice Powell dismissed the expectation theory by stating that:
When all of the production employees were laid off indefinitely ... there could
have been little hope-and certainly no reasonable expectation-that [the
employer] would ever reopen. Nor was it reasonable for the employees to expect
that [the employer's] failed textile operations would be resumed by a corporation
not then in existence.
482 U.S. at 57 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist, who joined Justice Powell's dissent
in Fall River, had earlier argued in Burns against such an expansion of the doctrine, and cau-
tioned "against extending successorship, under the banner of industrial peace, step by step to a
point where the only connection between the two employing entities is a naked transfer of
employees." Burns, 406 U.S. at 306-07 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
81. Another means of transferring business is by relocating plants or subcontracting. In
such cases, capital mobility considerations are equally as critical. Professor Klare has noted
that "[tihe effort to shelter capital investment decisions ... from employee participation has
manifested a cancerous growth in American labor law in recent times." Klare, The Public!
Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358, 1402 (1982). For an analysis of
arbitration and subcontracting, see Comment, Arbitral Treatment of Subcontracting After
Milwaukee Spring II: Much Ado About Nothing?, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 371 (1989).
82. A review of arbitration decisions published in Labor Arbitration Reports (BNA) and
Labor Arbitration Awards (CCH) has not yet revealed any cases that refer to Fall River.
Accordingly, all of the arbitrations referred to in Section III of this Comment predate the Fall
River decision.
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III. SUCCESSORSHIP DOCTRINE: ARBITRATIONS
There exists an incongruity concerning the use of successorship
doctrine in arbitrations that must be emphasized before examining
arbitration decisions. The Supreme Court cases relied upon for the
basic doctrine concern whether a "successor" employer actually is a
successor with an obligation to either bargain or arbitrate with a
union."s Arbitrators often use the doctrine, however, not to decide
whether there is a duty to bargain or arbitrate, but rather to deter-
mine seniority rights, 4 vacation rights, 5 and layoffs.8 6 Thus, arbitra-
tors use the doctrine in a context other than the one in which it was
developed, in order to ascertain the intent of employers and unions
when they used the term "successor" in a contract clause.
For the purposes of this Comment, two lines of "successorship"
arbitrations will be distinguished: those against predecessor compa-
nies and those against successor companies. As the Supreme Court
suggested in Howard Johnson, when a predecessor breaches a collec-
tive bargaining agreement by failing to obtain an assumption of the
agreement by a successor, remedies remain available to the union
against the predecessor.8 7 Thus, arbitrations against predecessor
companies generally are of two types: an attempt to prevent or enjoin
a proposed sale; or an attempt to recover damages from the predeces-
sor following a sale to a successor company. The resulting decisions
in both situations have a critical impact on the free transfer of capital.
These arbitrations often require an analysis of the parties' expecta-
tions and sense of entitlements 8 running back to the time when the
83. Neither of the collective bargaining agreements at issue in Wiley or Burns had
successorship clauses. See Comment, Successorship Clauses in Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV. 99, 103, 108. There"was, however, a successor clause in
Howard Johnson. 417 U.S. at 266 n.1.
84. Standard Beverage Co., 80-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8022 (1979) (Thomell, Arb.).
85. Universal Mack Sales & Serv., Inc., 86-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) T 8536 (1986)
(Chance, Arb.).
86. Little Rose Coal Co., 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1103 (1985) (Feldman, Arb.).
87. Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 257-58.
88. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). Calabresi and Melamed, in
defining entitlement, state:
The first issue which must be faced by any legal system is one we call the
problem of "entitlement." Whenever a state is presented with the conflicting
interests of two or more people, or two or more groups of people, it must decide
which side to favor. Absent such a decision, access to goods, services, and life
itself will be decided on the basis of "might makes right" - whoever is stronger
or shrewder will win. Hence the fundamental thing that law does is to decide
which of the conflicting parties will be entitled to prevail.
Id. at 1090 (footnote omitted). Calabresi and Melamed also point out that there are three
types of entitlements: entitlements protected by property rules, entitlements protected by lia-
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contracts were negotiated.8 9
Arbitrations against successor companies are more varied than
those against predecessors. In the typical successor case, an employer
retains employees and willingly arbitrates whether there are obliga-
tions that run back to the predecessor seller's agreement with the
union. 90 The issues may concern union recognition, 91 seniority
rights-including recall rights,92 vacation time,93 the merger of sen-
iority lists,94 medical plan contributions,95 or even such seemingly
mundane matters as whether a union can maintain a bulletin board
for its members on the employer's premises. 96 Although each of these
issues have obvious cost considerations, the impact of capital mobility
considerations on these arbitrations is minimal. The apparent intent
of the parties in these arbitrations is to clean up and clarify unsettled
issues remaining from the sale of the company so that the parties will
be able to coexist peaceably in the future. 97
bility rules, and inalienable entitlements. Id. at 1092. An entitlement is protected by a prop-
erty rule if it may be voluntarily bought and sold for value. Id.
89. Parties are entitled to the benefits of contract clauses if actual bargaining occurred
concerning the clauses. Some contract language is often included in a contract as a matter of
course, with no real bargaining over the terms. If there has been no real bargaining, then
neither party may be able to claim to be entitled to the benefit of the clause. This may
sometimes produce harsh results for the union. See, e.g., Wyatt Mfg. Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
153 (1983) (Goodman, Arb.) (Arbitrator placed the burden on the union to prove that a
successor clause which appeared in a collective bargaining agreement for twenty-five years had
been the subject of negotiations.). For a discussion of placing a value on entitlements in
collective bargaining negotiations, see D. LESLIE, CASES & MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW:
PROCESS AND POLICY 371-72 (2d ed. 1985). See also Wachter & Cohen, The Law and
Economics of Collective Bargaining.- An Introduction and Application to the Problems of
Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1364-77 (1988).
90. See, e.g., Don Lee Distrib., Inc., 85-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8272 (1984) (Stieber,
Arb.); Allied Employers, Inc., 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 297 (1984) (Armstrong, Arb.); Standard
Beverage Co., 80-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8022 (1979) (Thornell, Arb.).
91. United Food & Commercial Workers, 86-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8525 (1986)
(Lesnick, Arb.).
92. Seam Coal, Ltd., 86-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8041 (1985) (Duff, Arb.).
93. Custom Janitorial Serv., 84-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8060 (1983) (Phelan, Arb.).
94. Burnside-Graham Ready Mix, Inc., 86-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8214 (1986)
(Wren, Arb.).
95. Tri-State Asphalt Corp., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 102 (1979) (LeWinter, Arb.).
96. Maul Technology Corp., 83-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8295 (1983) (Ipavec, Arb.).
97. This is consistent with the argument that arbitrators are really only setting terms that
the parties could not have agreed upon because of the infinite variety of situations that are
unanticipated when a contract is negotiated. St. Antoine, Deferral to Arbitration and Use of
External Law in Arbitration, 10 INDuS. REL. L.J. 19, 20 (1988). This is particularly cogent in
the context of successor arbitrations precisely because the parties in arbitration-the union and
the successor-obviously were not the parties who negotiated the collective bargaining
agreement that is in dispute.
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A. Predecessor Arbitrations
1. PRE-SALE
In most instances of the sale of a company, the union only learns
of the sale after the deal is done. It is the rare situation in which an
attempt can be made, through arbitration, to protect the rights of
employees from collective bargaining agreement violations before the
sale is consummated. 98  For example, in Hosanna Trading Co. , an
employer declared its intention to sell or transfer its business to
another firm that would not recognize either the collective bargaining
agreement or the union. 1°° Relying solely on the language of the col-
lective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator prohibited the sale, trans-
fer, or assignment of the business, either directly or indirectly, unless
the seller obtained an express written assumption of the collective bar-
gaining agreement from the potential purchaser. 10 The arbitrator
stated that any other decision would deny the employees the protec-
tive rights and economic benefits that had been achieved through col-
lective bargaining and union representation.0 2
Similarly, in Sexton's Steak House, Inc.,13 the arbitrator
enjoined the sale of a restaurant when a purchaser refused to be
bound by the collective bargaining agreement and the predecessor
98. See Gallivan's, Inc., 82-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8411 (1982) (Gallagher, Arb.);
Sexton's Steak House, Inc., 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 576 (1981) (Ross, Arb.); Hosanna Trading
Co., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 128 (1980) (Simons, Arb.).
In some cases, the union is forced to go to court to enjoin a potential sale and obtain an
order requiring the seller company to arbitrate with the union. See Local Lodge No. 1266,
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1981). In Panoramic, a
"status quo injunction" restraining an employer from completing a sale of corporate assets
pending arbitration was properly issued, and upheld. The union had successfully argued that
the issue of whether the sale violated the collective bargaining agreement because the seller did
not require the purchaser to assume the collective bargaining agreement should be decided by
an arbitrator. Id. at 279. The court of appeals agreed, noting that the interpretation of the
successor clause in the contract was a function of the arbitrator, not the courts. Id. at 288; see
also Gallivan's, Inc., 82-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8411 (1982) (Gallagher, Arb.).
99. 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 128 (1980) (Simons, Arb.).
100. Id. at 129.
101. Id. at 131. Paragraph 68 of the labor agreement provided that:
The parties agree that this agreement shall be binding upon the Association,
the members of the Association and the Union and their respective transferees,
successors and assigns, and that they will faithfully comply with its provisions.
In the event that a member of the Association sells or transfers the business
or the shop, such member shall nevertheless continue to be liable for the
complete performance of this agreement until the purchaser or transferee
expressly agrees in writing with the Union that it is fully bound by the terms of
this agreement.
Id.
102. Id. at 131-32.
103. 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 576 (1981) (Ross, Arb.).
1989] SUCCESSORSHIP DOCTRINE
employer had not required the purchaser to assume the labor agree-
ment.1" As in Hosanna, the collective bargaining agreement con-
tained a clause that obligated the selling employer to require as a
condition of any transfer or sale that the successor be bound by the
labor agreement.105 The arbitrator distinguished the Supreme Court's
decisions in Burns and Howard Johnson as inapposite because they
determined the obligations of a purchaser under a collective bargain-
ing agreement executed by a predecessor. 106 Nevertheless, the arbitra-
tor applied what is essentially the Wiley test of "substantial
continuity" to find that the prospective purchaser was a successor as
defined in the collective bargaining agreement.17 Therefore, the
clause in the labor agreement requiring the employer to bind a poten-
tial successor to the agreement was applicable and the sale was
enjoined to prevent a breach of the collective bargaining agreement. 108
In Gallivan's, Inc. ,109 however, the arbitrator held that a restau-
rant owner did not violate the collective bargaining agreement when it
agreed to sell the business without obtaining assumption of the labor
agreement." 0 The arbitrator stated that the successor language in the
contract was too general in nature to bind the parties,'11 and that
stronger language was rejected during the collective bargaining nego-
tiations. 12 Although prior arbitrations do not necessarily have prece-
dential value," 3 the arbitrator cited both Hosanna and Sexton's as
104. Id. at 579.
105. Id. at 577. Section 26 of the collective bargaining agreement stated: "This Agreement
shall be binding on any and all successors and assigns of the Employer, whether by sale,
transfer, merger, acquisition, consolidation or otherwise. The Employer shall make it a
condition of transfer that the successor or assigns shall be bound by the terms of this
Agreement." Id.
106. Id. at 578. Burns and Howard Johnson determined the legal, rather than contractual,
obligations of purchasers or successors to arbitrate or bargain with a union, while the instant
case was concerned with the obligations of the vendor of the business. Id.
107. Id. at 578-79. Arbitrator Ross did not cite Wiley or make the distinction that it also
was a determination of a successor's obligations to arbitrate. Therefore, it was equally as
inapposite as Burns or Howard Johnson.
108. Id. at 579.
109. 82-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) T 8411 (1982) (Gallagher, Arb.). The union earlier had
filed an action in federal court to enjoin the sale pending arbitration. On the same day,
however, the action was suspended when the parties stipulated that the closing would not
occur until after the arbitration. Id. at 4835.
110. Id. at 4840.
Ill. Id. at 4842. Article 17, Section 1 of the contract provided that "[t]he terms and
provisions ... shall bind all of the sublessees, assignees, purchasers or other successors to the
business to such terms and provisions, to which the employees are and shall be entitled to
under this Agreement." Id. at 4835.
112. Id. at 4840-42.
113. See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 414-36 (4th
ed. 1985). Prior arbitration awards, although not binding in the sense that legal decisions are,
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examples of contract language sufficient to bind a predecessor in
obtaining an assumption of the agreement from a successor." 4 The
arbitrator stated that a seller's obligation to obtain an assumption of
the labor agreement from a purchaser must be unambiguous for the
clause to be enforced. 115 The arbitrator reasoned that because the
obligation may be imposed only if set out in express terms, a general
statement of a binding effect on successors should not be considered
as an actual expression of an intent to obligate sellers to obtain a pur-
chaser's assumption of the collective bargaining agreement. 16
2. POST-SALE
The more typical arbitration against a predecessor or selling
employer occurs after the sale has been completed. The union in
these situations attempts to obtain damages because of the predeces-
sor's failure to obtain assumption of the labor agreement as a condi-
tion of the sale.' As in the pre-sale cases, the post-sale situation
usually turns on the relative specificity of the contract requirements
imposed upon the predecessor to obtain assumption of the collective
bargaining agreement by a successor." 8 Contract language merely
binding all successors, assigns, or purchasers often is found to be
insufficient to sustain a grievance against a predecessor" 9 unless there
is also explicit language obligating the seller to obtain an assumption
of the labor agreement from the purchaser. 21 In making this deter-
mination, arbitrators look at both the contract and the history of the
do have persuasive authority. Id. at 421. Prior awards aid arbitrators by enabling them to see
how other arbitrators have solved similar problems. Id. at 416, 430; see also infra note 241.
114. Gallivan's, 82-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8411, at 4840; see also Sexton's Steak
House, Inc., 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 576 (1981) (Ross, Arb.); Hosanna Trading Co., 74 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 128 (1980) (Simons, Arb.).
115. Gallivan's, 82-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8411, at 4840. Is this the equivalent of a
"clear and convincing" burden of proof standard, as compared with the mere "preponderance
of the evidence" standard in civil cases? Or is the arbitrator applying this standard because
there is a potential injunction?
116. Id. at 4842-43. The arbitrator emphasized that the union could have obtained
protection for its grievance by persisting in its proposal for more explicit contractual terms
during the negotiations of the agreement.
117. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 257-58 &
n.3 (1974).
118. See, e.g., Martin Podany Assocs., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 658 (1983) (Gallagher, Arb.);
High Point Sprinkler Co., 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 239 (1976) (Connolly, Arb.).
119. See, e.g., Gallivan's, 82-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8411, at 4839-40.
120. Id. As noted by the arbitrator in Gallivan's:
The obligation to require assumption is imposed if it is set out in express terms; it
is not imposed if the clause is nothing more than a recitation that successors are
to be bound .... [T]he general recitation of a binding effect on successors may
reflect nothing more than the inclusion of "boiler plate" by the contract drafters,
having no specific significance.
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negotiations concerning a successor clause.121
In Decatur Herald & Review, Inc. ,122 for example, the arbitrator
stated that, in the absence of a successor or assigns clause requiring a
purchaser to assume the collective bargaining agreement, the com-
pany could sell its business without requiring the successor to assume
the obligations of the union contract. This was irrespective of the fact
that the successor employer published the same newspaper and
employed some of the same employees. The arbitrator noted that
there was no discussion during the contract negotiations of a succes-
sor clause, and even suggested an example of a suitable clause.
123
In Wyatt Manufacturing Co.,124 the arbitrator followed the
rationale of Gallivan's, and required an express statement of an obli-
gation by an employer to obtain assumption of a labor agreement
from the purchaser. 125 To sustain the grievance, the arbitrator held
that the union must show that the company obligated itself in a provi-
sion of the collective bargaining agreement to insure that a buyer
would assume the collective bargaining agreement. Comparing suc-
cessorship clauses to a guarantee, the arbitrator rejected what he
termed "the notion that a guarantor status, or what amounts to that
status, can somehow be achieved through implication."' 26 Thus, the
arbitrator concluded that the seller should not be made accountable
for the decisions and actions of the buyer unless the agreement identi-
fied that responsibility in no uncertain terms. Although the language
at issue appeared in the contract for more than twenty-five years, the
arbitrator placed the burden on the union to demonstrate the intent of
the provision as originally negotiated.
27
Id. at 4840; see also Decatur Herald & Review, Inc., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 745 (1979) (Jones,
Arb.); Wyatt Mfg. Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 153 (1983) (Goodman, Arb.).
121. See, e.g., Decatur, 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 748; Gallivan's, 82-2 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH) 8411, at 4840; Wyatt, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 159-60.
122. 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 745 (1979) (Jones, Arb.).
123. The arbitrator proposed as a successors and assigns clause:
If, during the life of this contract, the ownership of any firm (or firms) signatory
to this contract changes in any manner whatsoever, such successor or successors
shall be bound by the provision of this contract until the expiration date thereof,
or until a new contract, mutually agreed upon, is signed by both parties.
Id. at 748. However, if one examines this clause in light of Gallivan's, supra notes 109-16 and
accompanying text, and Wyatt, infra notes 124-32 and accompanying text, it seems likely that
the arbitrators in those two cases probably would have held this clause to be ineffective in
imposing liability on the predecessor for a failure of the buyer to assume the contract.
124. 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 153 (1983) (Goodman, Arb.).
125. Id. at 162.
126. Id. at 163.
127. Id. at 159-60. Article II of the contract provided:
[T]his Agreement shall be binding upon the Company and its successors and
assigns and all of the terms and obligations herein contained shall not be affected
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Although cognizant that similar clauses have been sustained in
other arbitrations, 128 the Wyatt arbitrator characterized the union's
position as a "fascinating theory."' 29  The arbitrator stated that
adopting the union's position, that the successor clause obligated the
predecessor to find a buyer who would be bound by the collective
bargaining agreement, would be equivalent to prewarning potential
sellers that a business may not be sold unless a buyer can be found
who is willing to accept the collective bargaining agreement. 130 The
arbitrator stated that following the union's reasoning would grant
unions an enormous economic arsenal to use against predecessor
employers, particularly in light of the Supreme Court decision in
Howard Johnson."' The arbitrator noted that although Howard
Johnson enables some successor companies to avoid union efforts at
contract enforcement by refraining from hiring substantial numbers
of the employees of the predecessor, it also warns of remedies that
nevertheless remain open against the predecessor seller.13 2
Arbitrators, however, do not universally adopt the capital mobil-
ity views expressed in Wyatt. In High Point Sprinkler Co. ,133 contract
language similar to that in Wyatt was held binding on the predecessor
following an assignment of assets. 134  The arbitrator stated that,
although the predecessor company hardly was in a financial position
to insist that the non-union assignee be bound by the labor agreement,
or changed in any respect by the consolidation, sale, transfer or assignment of
any of the company, or any or all of its property, or affected or changed in any
respect by any change in legal status, ownership, or management of the
Company.
Id. at 153.
128. Id. at 160-61. The arbitrator cited to Martin Podany Assocs., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 658
(1983) (Gallagher, Arb.); High Point Sprinkler Co., 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 239 (1976)
(Connolly, Arb.); Sexton's Steak House, Inc., 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 576 (1981) (Ross, Arb.);
Hosanna Trading Co., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 128 (1980) (Simons, Arb.).
129. Wyatt, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 161.
130. Id.; see also NLRB v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 287-88 (1972)
(Transfer of capital may be inhibited if new employer is to be saddled with old collective
bargaining agreement.).
131. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
132. Wyatt, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 161. This case can be read as suggesting that free
capital mobility is critical to the survival of a business. If a union does not renegotiate or give
up contract rights to a successor, neither the business nor the jobs may survive. For an
example of this type of situation, see Martin Podany Assocs., 84-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH)
8469 (1984) (Gallagher, Arb.); Martin Podany Assocs., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 658 (1983)
(Gallagher, Arb.).
133. 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 239 (1976) (Connolly, Arb.).
134. Article 3 of the agreement provided: "This Agreement shall be binding upon the
parties hereto, their successors, administrators, executors and assigns. It is understood that
the parties hereto shall not use any sale, transfer, lease, assignment, receivership, or
bankruptcy to evade the terms of this Agreement." Id. at 240.
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the company nevertheless had a duty and an obligation to require
such an assumption.'35 Recognizing the economic benefit to the
union, the arbitrator concluded that the company's weakness in nego-
tiating with the assignee could not be used to deprive the union of the
protection conferred upon it by the successor clause.
1 36
A more specific clause was found to be binding on a predecessor
company in Martin Podany Associates.1 37 In Martin Podany, an
employer notified all of its employees that they would be fired after an
impending sale of the company, but that they could apply for employ-
ment with the new owner. 3 ' The wages and benefits offered by the
successor company, however, were less than those paid by the prede-
cessor. 139 The successor company opened for business on the next
business day. All of the successor's employees had worked for the
predecessor with the exception of its president. Shortly thereafter, the
union filed grievances against both the predecessor and the successor
and went on strike.' 4° Following a court order directing arbitration,
the successor company dissolved. The court then directed that the
grievances be arbitrated with the predecessor company. 41
The arbitrator noted that the Court in Howard Johnson had
stated that a remedy might have been available against the seller in
situations in which none were available against the buyer.1 42 After
reviewing prior arbitration decisions, 43 the arbitrator ruled that the
language of the successor clause in the collective bargaining agree-
ment was unambiguous. Thus, the arbitrator concluded, the
135. Id. at 248.
136. Id. The arbitrator saw this as the only logical conclusion one could make of the
successorship language in the agreement. "There would be no need for this clause if it were
otherwise." Id.
137. 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 658 (1983) (Gallagher, Arb.). Article 36 of the labor agreement
provided that: "The Employer agrees that all obligations under this contract, and the
performance thereof, by the buyer, lessee, transferee or assignee, become a condition of sale,
transfer, lease, or assignment." Id. at 659.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.; see also Martin Podany Assocs., 84-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) $ 8469, at 5048
(1984) (Gallagher, Arb.).
141. 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 659.
142. Id. at 661. In Howard Johnson, few of the employees of the predecessor had been hired
by the successor. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 252
(1974). In Martin Podany, however, all of the former employees were hired, albeit at lower
wages. 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 659.
143. Martin Podany, 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 661-62. The arbitrator reviewed Gallivan's,
Inc., 82-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8411 (1982) (Gallagher, Arb.); Sexton's Steak House,
Inc., 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 576 (1981) (Ross, Arb.); Hosanna Trading Co., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
128 (1980) (Simons, Arb.); and High Point Sprinkler Co., 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 239 (1976)
(Connolly, Arb.).
1989]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:403
employer breached the agreement when the business was sold without
obtaining the buyer's assumption of the agreement.'" In a subse-
quent arbitration, damages were awarded to the union and the
employees. 145 The predecessor company had to pay back wages and
contribute to the pension, retirement and disability, and health and
welfare funds of the union. These amounts were awarded from the
time the predecessor sold the business until the date of the closing of
the business by the successor, despite the fact that the union employ-
ees were on strike for most of that time. 46 In effect, the employees
were not penalized for striking, thus breaking the general labor rule of
"work first, grieve later,"'' 47 and the general contractual duty to miti-
gate damages. The arbitrator stated that the right to strike supersedes
the duty to work for the successor, so that the duty to mitigate the
damages must give way.
1 48
Similar results are found in Marley-Wylain Co.149  Marley-
Wylain sold the business and assets of one of its divisions to a buyer
that refused to assume the collective bargaining agreement. The
buyer terminated the employees but then rehired them as new
employees. 50 A new contract subsequently was negotiated with the
successor that diminished the benefits available to the rehired work-
ers. 5 ' The union then filed a grievance against the predecessor seller,
144. 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 663.
145. Martin Podany Assocs., 84-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8469 (1984) (Gallagher,
Arb.).
146. Id. at 5051.
147. See Gross & Greenfield, Arbitral Value Judgments in Health and Safety Disputes:
Management Rights over Workers' Rights, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 645, 648 (1985) (discussing
Ford Motor Co., 3 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 779, 781 (1944) (Shulman, Arb.)). Professor Feller,
however, disagrees with the necessity of mitigating damages in the arbitral context. Feller,
The Remedy Power in Grievance Arbitration, 5 INDus. REL. L.J. 128, 144-45 (1982) ("There is,
indeed, no duty to 'mitigate damages' because the arbitrator does not award damages. There
is, or should be, therefore, no requirement that the employee seek other employment, and no
deduction from the employee's back pay because of his failure to do so.") Professor Feller's
thesis is that the arbitrator should function merely as a contract reader for the parties, rather
than as a court. Id. He notes that arbitrators do not have to follow what courts will do in a
similar situation. For example, although courts normally include interest in damage awards
for breach of an employment contract, arbitrators rarely award interest. Id. at 145. Thus,
there is no necessity for an arbitrator to mimic what a court would do, and require the
mitigation of damages. Id. at 145-46.
148. Martin Podany, 84-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8469, at 5051. Lest the impression
be given that this arbitrator is exceedingly pro-labor, this is the same arbitrator who refused to
give effect to a successor clause in Gallivan's, Inc., 82-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8411
(1982) (Gallagher, Arb.).
149. 87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8293 (1987) (Jacobowski, Arb.).
150. Id. at 4257.
151. Id.
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claiming a breach of a duty to bind the buyer to the contract.15 2
The arbitrator in Marley- Wylain examined Wiley,1
53 Burns,154
and Howard Johnson,15 and found that the purchaser was a "succes-
sor" because there was continuity of the business and a majority of
the employees were rehired.156 The arbitrator then held that the lan-
guage of the collective bargaining agreement was sufficiently specific
to bind the predecessor seller. 5 7 Although other arbitrators had held
less specific language to be ineffective, the arbitrator noted that in this
case there was a significant history of bargaining by the parties over
the text of the successor language.' 58 Noting that the company previ-
ously had been sold more than once without labor problems, the arbi-
trator stated that the potential stability and harmony created by the
successor clause may have facilitated the profitable resale of the
company. 1
59
Finally, the arbitrator relied upon past practice to reinforce his
decision: In each of the prior sales of the company, the successor
company followed the prior contract."6 Thus, the prior sales raised
an expectancy on the part of the employees that in the event of a
future sale the contract would similarly be followed. In this sale,
however, the seller knew that the successor would not follow the con-
tract, but did not notify the union.161 By witholding notice of the sale,
the seller apparently delegated the termination to the buyer, and
152. Id.
153. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
154. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
155. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
156. Marley-Wylain, 87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8293, at 4261.
157. Id. at 4262. Article 1.1 of the agreement was effective "between ... Marley-Wylain
Company, its successors or assigns." Id. at 4257. Compare this language with the language
from the contract in Gallivan's, 82-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8411, at 4835, and Wyatt, 82
Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 153. See supra notes 111 & 127. However, Article 1.4 of the labor
agreement also stated: "[Elach of the parties acknowledges and accepts responsibility for
fulfillment of their respective obligations under this Agreement . Marley-Wylain, 87-1
Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8293, at 4257.
158. Marley-Wylain, 87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8293, at 4262.
159. Id. This rationale may be interpreted as an economic efficiency counterpoint to the
"fascinating theory" argument offered by the arbitrator in Wyatt. For a discussion of Wyatt,
see supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. Although Arbitrator Jacobowski in Marley-
Wylain discusses mutual benefits because of the successor language, there is no discussion of
the price paid for the company. Did Marley-Wylain receive a higher price from the purchaser
because of the purchaser's refusal to accept or assume the contract than it would have received
if the contract were to be assumed? If so, then an award of damages to the union would
theoretically reduce the price that Marley-Wylain actually received. See NLRB v. Burns Int'l
Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 287-88 (1972); supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text; see
also J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 166-67 (1983).
160. Marley- Wylain, 87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8293, at 4263.
161. Id.
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thereby deprived the union of any opportunity to preserve the con-
tract before the sale was completed.' 62
Thus, arbitrators in predecessor cases primarily rely on the inter-
pretation of specific language of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, 163 and secondarily on prior arbitrations for guidance-despite
their supposed lack of precedential effect.' 64 Most arbitrators try to
recognize their role as that of a "'contract reader' for the parties,
rather than a learned interpreter of public statutes."'' 65 This role as
"contract reader" is particularly crucial in the successorship context
because public law does not give unions entitlements in this area.
1 66
When forced to give meaning to words in a contract, such as who is a
successor, arbitrators depend upon the successor doctrine as elabo-
rated in Wiley,' 67 Burns,168  and Howard Johnson.169  In many
instances, the most relevant application of the doctrine to predecessor
cases comes from the suggestion in Howard Johnson that other reme-
dies are available to the unions to use against the seller when a succes-
sor fails to hire the seller's employees and has not otherwise expressly
assumed the labor agreement in contravention of a collective bargain-
ing agreement. 70 This remedy implicitly allows capital to be mobile
between predecessor and successor, with the union then left hoping
for a recovery against the predecessor.
B. Successor Arbitrations
Successor arbitrations between a union and a successor company
162. Id.
163. The predecessor arbitrations are particularly unusual because the clauses often appear
in the contract for years, almost as a matter of course, without any significant negotiation or
bargaining as to the wording. Only if the company is sold do these dormant clauses come to
life, and require interpretation. At least one commentator has urged that negotiators for
management avoid any reference to successor language in collective bargaining agreements
because of the potential loss of business opportunities that may occur if a sale is enjoined.
Irving, Closing and Sales of Businesses: A Settled Area?, 33 LAB. L.J. 218, 229 (1982); see also
Emanuel, The Management Perspective, 10 INDUS. REL. L.J. 66, 75-76 (1988).
164. For a discussion of the role of precedent in arbitrations, see supra note 113 and infra
note 241.
165. Arco Metals Co., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1209, 1212 (1987) (Berkowitz, Arb.).
166. United States labor laws give virtually no substantive rights to workers beyond
minimum wage and maximum hour legislation. Siskind, Employer Instability and Union
Decline.: Problems in the Law of Successorship, 39 PROC. N.Y.U. ANN. NAT'L. CONF. ON
LABOR § 8, at 8-3 (1986). Labor laws do confer procedural rights such as the right to organize
into unions, and the union's right to engage in collective bargaining. Id. at 8-4. More
substantive employee rights and entitlements must be negotiated in collective bargaining. Id.
167. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
168. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
169. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
170. See id. at 257-58 (1974); see also supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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arise in a different context than do the predecessor arbitrations. In a
predecessor arbitration, there is little or no expectation of a continu-
ing relationship between the union and the company. The union is
either seeking an injunction to force the employer to obtain assump-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement from the successor, or is
attempting to obtain damages for an employer's failure to do so. In
either case, the contractual relationship between these two parties is
at an end,171 and there is no incentive for the parties to maintain a
pretense of cooperative labor-management relations. On the other
hand, a successor arbitration takes place in an atmosphere in which
both the union and the company have an expectation that their rela-
tionship will continue. Thus, the particular arbitration usually
involves an issue of contract interpretation of a prior collective bar-
gaining agreement in which the successor company has replaced the
original employer.' 72 Therefore, it generally is in the interest of both
the company and the union that the pretense of good labor-manage-
ment relationships be maintained in the successor context.'
73
171. This also signals the end of any further opportunity for the arbitrator to be chosen by
these two particular parties again. This does not, however, remove all constraints on the
arbitrator. Although he or she may not be chosen again by these two particular parties, his or
her record on arbitrations surely will be examined by other parties, in other arbitrations, as
they decide who will arbitrate their dispute. One commentator has pointed out the critical
importance of an arbitrator's prior decisions in the selection of an arbitrator by the parties to a
dispute. Jones, "His Own Brand of Industrial Justice ". The Stalking Horse of Judicial Review
of Labor Arbitration, 30 UCLA L. REV. 881, 889-91 (1983). As Professor Jones notes, there
are commercial services which categorize and summarize the decisions issued by a particular
arbitrator in order to facilitate this selection process. Id.; see also Getman, Labor Arbitration
and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916 (1979). As pointed out by Professor Getman,
arbitral independence is essential to the integrity of the arbitration process. Id. at 927-28. Yet
the close examination of an arbitrator's prior decisions by the parties before choosing an
arbitrator often cuts against this independence. Id. Getman also notes that some
commentators castigate arbitration because of the arbitrator's financial dependence on the
parties to the dispute. Id. at 928; see also P. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATION: A DISSENTING
VIEW 59-67, 112 (1966). Judge Hays argues that because arbitrators are appointees of the
parties, they are inevitably subjected to political pressures from those who control their
appointment. Id. at 60. Therefore, an arbitrator's preoccupation with maintaining
acceptability to the parties may distort the resulting decisions in arbitrations. Id. at 61.
172. Although many successor arbitrations concern issues that affect all of the union
members, as in arbitrations with predecessors, many involve contract interpretation affecting
only a few, or even one employee. See, e.g., Little Rose Coal Co., 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1103
(1985) (Feldman, Arb.); Seam Coal, Ltd., 86-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8041 (1985) (Duff,
Arb.); Don Lee Distrib., Inc., 85-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8272 (1984) (Stieber, Arb.);
Custom Janitorial Serv., 84-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8060 (1983) (Phelan, Arb.).
173. The nature of the relationship between the union and the employer also may influence
the way the arbitrator reasons in order to demonstrate the legitimacy of the opinion. In any
arbitration, the arbitrator must be sensitive to the continuing nature of the collective
bargaining relationship from which the grievance has arisen. See Jones, supra note 171, at 884.
It is a common characteristic of collective bargaining agreements that they are for relatively
short terms: one to three years. Id. at 896. Thus, as Professor Jones has noted, it is the usual
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Standard Beverage Co. ,' illustrates the application of the doc-
trine in a post-sale successor arbitration. Standard purchased assets,
inventory, and beer distribution rights from another distributor,
Roper Distributing. 7 5 When Roper ceased operations, it terminated
all six of its employees. Standard immediately thereafter hired four of
the six, giving no credit for their former seniority with Roper. 176 The
employees that were hired, as well as the union, filed a grievance
based on the loss of seniority. 177 The two employees that were not
hired also filed a grievance claiming that they should be recalled to
active employment with backpay.
17 1
The arbitrator relied on the doctrine of Wiley, 1 7 9 Burns,180 and
Howard Johnson 181 to find that Standard was a successor to Roper.
The arbitrator pointed out that there was continuity in the work
force, in the business, and in the appropriateness of the bargaining
unit. There was also no hiatus in operations. 182 He characterized the
successorship language in the contract as "somewhat more encom-
passing than many other contracts."'' 8 3 The arbitrator sustained the
grievance of the employees who were hired, and required recognition
of their seniority status by the successor, 184 but denied the grievance
of the two former employees not hired by the successor. The arbitra-
tor stated that he could not find authority for requiring a successor to
expectation of collective bargainers that the result of an occasional aberrant arbitration
decision will be returned to the same process of negotiation that created the arbitrator's
authority in the first place. Id. Therefore, it is common for vexatious arbitration awards to be
effectively modified or vacated in the negotiations for a new contract. Id. This is particularly
relevant within the successor arbitrations where there is an expectation of a continuing
relationship. In contrast, in the predecessor arbitrations, the relationship between the union
and the former employer effectively is at an end, at least for the particular bargaining unit.
174. 80-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) q 8022 (1979) (Thornell, Arb.).
175. Id. at 3078.
176. Id. at 3079.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
180. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
181. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
182. Standard, 80-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8022, at 3080-81.
183. Id. at 3080. The arbitrator did not cite or otherwise refer to any other arbitrations in
making this assertion. The pertinent language appeared in Article XVI, Section 7, of the
contract, and stated:
In the event any Employer covered by this Agreement goes out of business or the
unit covered by this Agreement is acquired, purchased by or merged with
another Employer, whether or not covered by this Agreement, any successor
Employer shall automatically become a party to this Agreement and be bound by
the Agreement and the Union shall be bound to the successor as it was to the
previous Employer.
Id. at 3079.
184. Id. at 3081.
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hire the predecessor's employees.' 85
The Standard arbitrator's view of management prerogative
sharply contrasts with the employee protection provided in Don Lee
Distributor, Inc. 186 In Don Lee, a collective bargaining agreement pro-
vision had been negotiated with the predecessor, giving employees the
right to continued employment with a transferee company. Pursuant
to this agreement, the transferee company had to accept a worker
who was an admitted alcoholic.' 87 The arbitrator granted that the
company could not be faulted if it did not hire an alcoholic as a new
employee.'88 The grievant, however, was not being considered for
employment as a new hire.'8 9 Accordingly, the arbitrator reasoned
that the grievant had a right to continued employment. 90 If the com-
pany wanted to fire him as an established employee, it would need just
cause. 1
91
Seniority issues, such as the right to recall after layoff, or vaca-
tion time, are the most frequently arbitrated successor issues. For
example, in Little Rose Coal Co., 192 a coal mining business ended
operations and placed its employees on layoff. 193 Two days later, a
new company, Little Rose Coal, began mining operations at the same
site. '94 The workers protested and asked for their jobs back, main-
taining that Little Rose was nothing more than a continuation of the
185. Id. It is true that there is no authority requiring the hiring of the employees of a
predecessor. See Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 261 (citing Burns, 406 U.S. at 280 n.5).
Nevertheless, the arbitrator's analysis is inconsistent. First, he uses the doctrine from Wiley,
Burns, and Howard Johnson that, narrowly interpreted, can be read not to apply, because
technically those cases concerned the duty to arbitrate or bargain, which is not the case here.
Then he ignores the doctrine, and in particular, Howard Johnson, in holding that the two
unhired employees need not be hired. Howard Johnson makes clear that if a purchaser does
not hire the predecessor employees, then he is not a successor, at least as far as an obligation to
arbitrate. Here, the arbitrator is both using and ignoring the implications of the doctrine at the
same time, for he could have held that because Standard hired four of the six employees, it was
a successor, and was therefore obligated to hire all of them. It is not clear from the facts of the
case whether the seniority of the two grievants who were not hired was greater than, or less
than, the seniority of the four employees who were hired by Standard. Assuming that either of
the two non-hired grievants had more seniority than those that were hired, how can the
arbitrator obligate Standard to recognize seniority acquired previously, but not hire or recall
workers from the predecessor on the basis of their acquired seniority?
186. 85-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8272 (1984) (Stieber, Arb.).
187. There was no evidence that the employee's work had ever been adversely affected by





192. 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1103 (1985) (Feldman, Arb.).
193. Id. at 1104.
194. Id.
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former operator at the site.'95 The arbitrator placed the burden on
the union as the moving party to show a connection between the two
successive operators that would enable the arbitrator to consider the
second company to be a successor.' 96 The union was unable to meet
the burden. Relying on the fact that there was no direct transaction
between Little Rose and the former operator, the arbitrator ruled that
the companies did not have a predecessor-successor relationship.
Therefore, the employees were not entitled to recall.' 97
Seniority arbitrations also arise when a company is merged into a
larger entity. 98  In Burnside-Graham Ready Mix, Inc.,199 a joint ven-
ture took over the operations of several consolidated cement compa-
nies."° The union and the company disagreed over which employees
should be laid off or transferred, and over which collective bargaining
agreement was controlling.2"' The arbitrator stated that formalistic
differences were not critical in determining which of the companies
was a predecessor or successor because both companies had identical
successor clauses in their collective bargaining agreements.20 2 Citing
the Supreme Court's statement in Wiley that the "flexible procedures"
of arbitration may fashion a remedy without disrupting labor rela-
tions,2"3 the arbitrator decided to merge the two seniority lists.2"
195. Id. at 1104-05.
196. Id. at 1106.
197. Id. However, there was some connection in that the two operators were leasing the
land on which the mine was located from the same corporation. Id. at 1104. There was also
some evidence that Little Rose acquired equipment from an individual who had been affiliated
with the prior operation. Id.; see also Seam Coal, Ltd., 86-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8041,
at 3167 (1985) (Duff, Arb.) (burden of proving successorship falls on the union-a viable
connection or linkage between the two employers must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence). But see Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987) (where
direct transactions between companies were unnecessary to consider the new employer as a
successor, at least in a duty to bargain context).
198. This was a major point of contention in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376
U.S. 543 (1964).
199. 86-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8214 (1986) (Wren, Arb.).
200. Id. at 3902. In 1983, Burnside Concrete Company and Graham Lumber Company
consolidated their ready mix concrete operations as Burnside-Graham Ready Mix, Inc. Id.
All parties agreed that the employees would be represented by the same union local. Id. In
1984, Burnside-Graham entered discussions with a competitor, Hi Hill Ready Mix, Inc., about
merging some of their operations in Columbus, Indiana. Id. The Hi Hill workers were
represented by the same union local as the Burnside-Graham employees. Id. This merger,
operating as a joint venture, began in 1985. Id.
201. Id. at 3904.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 3905 (citing Wiley, 376 U.S. at 551 n.5).
204. Id. at 3907. Unlike Wiley, however, in which the Wiley employees had not been
organized, this case presented the arbitrator with an easier decision. All of the employees of
the predecessor companies were unionized, and in fact were represented by the same union.
Id. at 3902. Thus, the arbitrator essentially was resolving a competitive conflict among the
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The issue of vacation pay in the context of successor arbitrations
generally arises when the successor company shortens or refuses to
recognize vacation entitlements that employees would have received
from the predecessor employer. In Universal Mack Sales & Service,
Inc.,2"5 the successor company refused to allow carryover employees
to take vacations during their first year of employment, even though
the collective bargaining agreement of the predecessor had been
assumed, and then renegotiated. 20 6 Rather than acknowledge that the
carryover employees had many years of service with the predecessor,
the successor wanted to treat each as a new hire who would normally
not be entitled to vacation until after one year of employment. 20 7 The
arbitrator required the employer to adhere to the vacation entitle-
ments earned with the predecessor.20 8 In doing so, he held that con-
tinuous service for purposes of vacation entitlement ran from the date
of hire by the predecessor employer, while continuous service for
determining seniority ran from the date of employment with the suc-
cessor employer. 20 9 The arbitrator relied on the fact that during nego-
tiations between the union and the successor over modifications to the
contract, the employer had not expressly identified vacation time as
an area of the agreement that it wished to change. Without such an
identification during contract negotiations, the arbitrator refused to
confer upon the employer an after-the-fact reduction in employee
entitlements.210
The critical nature of negotiations to determine carryover entitle-
employees, rather than between the union and the employer. See also Peter F. Mitchell Corp.,
85-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8118 (1984) (Davis, Arb.) (Two companies employing the
same workers interchangeably and having the same collective bargaining agreements with the
union were ordered to merge seniority lists.).
205. 86-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8536 (1986) (Chance, Arb.).
206. Id. at 5255.
207. Id. at 5256.
208. Id. at 5257-58.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 5257; see also Custom Janitorial Serv., 84-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8060
(1983) (Phelan, Arb.) (An employee on sick leave when a successor acquires his employer is
not a new employee, and is entitled to vacation time based on amount of seniority and service
with predecessor employers.); Metropolitan Contract Servs., Inc., 82-2 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH) 8596 (1982) (Thornell, Arb.) (Company conducting business at same location, with
same employees, and with little or no hiatus in operations is a successor employer so that the
employees are entitled to vacation time based on their seniority with the predecessor
company.). But see RRS, Inc., 86-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8213 (1985) (Redel, Arb.). In
RRS, non-union employees of a successor company organized and negotiated a contract. The
arbitrator held that such a contract will be read strictly, so that seniority for vacation time will
be based upon continuous service with the successor employer, even if vacation time prior to
collective bargaining had been based upon continuous service with both the successor
employer and the predecessor. Id. at 3901.
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ments is also apparent in Allied Employers, Inc., 211 where the arbitra-
tor relied upon Burns212 and Howard Johnson213 for doctrine
concerning the duty to bargain and arbitrate. Following a partial sale
of assets, the successor terminated all employees and then rehired cer-
tain of the employees and negotiated a new contract.2"4 During these
negotiations, the rehired employees gave up certain seniority rights
that were earned during their tenure at the predecessor in return for
higher wages. 21 5 The arbitrator relied upon the economic efficiency
and transfer of capital arguments of Burns, ruling that the workers
could exchange some of their contract rights for higher compensa-
tion.21 6 Consequently, although the employees who were rehired
were being paid more than before, the company theoretically could
function more efficiently and profitably because those who were cho-
sen had the most efficient performance.2 17
One of the more complicated issues in successor arbitrations is
the liability of the successor for the acts of the predecessor. 21 8 In
Schneier's Finer Foods, Inc. ,2 19 a unionized company purchased the
assets and liabilities of a second unionized company that had a clause
in its collective bargaining agreement binding successors for the full
term of the agreement. The purchase agreement, however, specifi-
cally stated that the purchaser would not be bound by the existing
labor contracts of the seller. All of the former employees were hired
by the purchasing company.22° Although the parties had stipulated
that the purchasing company was a successor, the arbitrator pro-
ceeded to analyze the situation in the light of Wiley, Burns, and How-
ard Johnson.22' He construed those decisions as meaning that a
potential successor may avoid both the predecessor's labor agreement
211. 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 297 (1984) (Armstrong, Arb.).
212. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
213. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
214. Allied Employers, 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 300.
215. Id. at 301.
216. Id. For a discussion on the valuation of entitlements in collective bargaining
negotiations, see generally Schwab, Collective Bargaining and the Coase Theorem, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 245 (1987). Professor Schwab points out that unions may exchange higher wages in
return for not insisting on entitlements negotiated in prior contracts, or for legal entitlements.
Id. at 277.
217. Allied Employers, 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 301.
218. For the Supreme Court's approach to this issue, see Golden State Bottling Co. v.
NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973). See also supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
219. 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 881 (1979) (Belkin, Arb.).
220. The union previously had obtained a restraining order enjoining the sale. The parties
thereafter entered into negotiations and reached an agreement under which the successor had
to hire all of the predecessor's employees and pay them their former rae of pay pending a
determination of their status through negotiation. Id. at 883.
221. Id. at 885.
[Vol. 44:403
SUCCESSORSHIP DOCTRINE
and its duty to bargain with the employees "if it chooses not to hire a
majority of the predecessor's employees." '2 22 The arbitrator stated,
however, that the circumstances of the sale must be examined when a
successor does hire or retain a majority of its predecessor's employ-
ees.22 3 In addition to the usual factors of continuity of work place,
operations, and nature of the work, the arbitrator added an analysis of
the viability of the predecessor. 224 Further, the arbitrator noted that
the former owner of the predecessor company was now a corporate
officer and substantial stockholder in the successor company.225
Thus, as in Wiley, the transaction resembled a merger more than a
mere purchase of the predecessor. The arbitrator then ruled that the
successor was liable for the predecessor's breach of the successorship
clause in its labor agreements.226
Noting the discretion given to arbitrators to fashion realistic and
workable solutions, the arbitrator fashioned a remedy imposing liabil-
ity on the successor in the areas of wages, pensions, and fringe benefits
for the former employees of the predecessor. 2 7 The arbitrator specifi-
cally took into account such factors as the future contractual relation-
ship of the parties and the impact of successorship upon all of the
employees of the successor.228 Moreover, the arbitrator expressed
concern over the long-term impact of the decision on the work force,
and concluded that restoration of the positive aspects of the pre-
existing labor-management relationship had been a goal of the
222. Id. at 886.
223. Id.
224. Id. Of course, the suggestion in Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive
Board., 417 U.S. 249 (1974), of potential remedies against the predecessor is useless unless
there is some viable entity to proceed against. In Howard Johnson, there was a viable entity
against which to proceed. Id. at 258.
225. Schneier's, 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 886.
226. Id. at 887. Although the arbitrator does not mention Golden State Bottling Co. v.
NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973), his reasoning follows that of the Court in that case. The
successor's knowledge and notice of the predecessor's liability was an important issue in both
cases: an outstanding NLRB order in Golden State and the successor clauses in the
predecessor's contracts in Schneier's. 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 887.
227. Schneier's, 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 888-89. Arbitrators arguably are merely supposed
to interpret the collective bargaining agreement. See Cox, Reflections upon Labor Arbitration
in the Light of the Lincoln Mills Case, 12 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. 24, 37-38 (1959).
Nevertheless, the propensity and ability of arbitrators to "fashion" remedies has been criticized
by some commentators. Professor Cox has stated that "arbitrators frequently fashion remedies
for breach of a collective agreement without a shred of contract language to guide them." Id.
Professor Feller has also pointed out that some arbitrators see their mission as doing what
seems right in a particular situation without regard either to law or to the contract. See Feller,
supra note 147, at 152.
228. Schneier's, 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 888-89.
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arbitration.229
In summary, successor arbitrations are usually conducted in a
more cooperative atmosphere than predecessor arbitrations. As in the
predecessor cases, arbitrators rely on the doctrine expressed in
Wiley, 230 Burns,23  and Howard Johnson232 in defining a successor.
The solutions to issues such as vacation rights, seniority, scholarships
for children, or health insurance may turn on interpretation of con-
tract language, negotiations, or past practice. Although there are cer-
tainly cost considerations in these issues, there is little likelihood that
these factors will actually affect whether there is a sale or transfer of
the company. Capital mobility considerations are consequentially
minimal, and only seldom expressed by arbitrators.233
IV. ARBITRAL VALUES AND PROCESSES
There are several themes and recurrent patterns in arbitration
decisions that must be examined in order to more fully understand the
decisions. These run the gamut from interpretation of Supreme Court
doctrine to contract interpretation principles, and from collective bar-
gaining history to transfer of capital theories. Not all are present in
every arbitration decision. Foremost is the arbitrators' reliance on
Supreme Court doctrine as elucidated in Wiley, 3 Burns,235 and How-
ard Johnson.236 This doctrine may be used by an arbitrator to deter-
mine whether a purchaser is a successor and whether there exists a
duty to either arbitrate or bargain.2 37 Arbitrators generally are faith-
ful to the doctrine expressed by the Court: the Wiley test of "substan-
229. Id. This is perhaps one of the clearest examples of an arbitrator actually explaining his
underlying motives or values.
230. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
231. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
232. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
233. For example, the amount of vacation time to which employees are entitled during their
first year of work with the successor certainly has an economic cost to the successor. It seems
unlikely, however, that this cost alone would be determinative in controlling a potential
purchaser's decision to purchase a company. Thus, the impact on capital mobility is minimal.
234. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
235. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
236. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
237. The basic doctrine is concerned with the duty to arbitrate or bargain. See, e.g., Wiley,
376 U.S. 543; Burns, 406 U.S. 272. Although some arbitrators discuss the cases to justify their
"jurisdiction" (see, e.g., Allied Employers, Inc., 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 297 (1984) (Armstrong,
Arb.); Negco Enters., 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 633 (1976) (Helfeld, Arb.); American Petrofina,
Inc., 63 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1300 (1975) (Marlatt, Arb.)), in most cases jurisdiction is not the
central issue. Yet the arbitrators impliedly use the doctrine to ground their decisions on some
type of theory or rationale. The doctrine is most frequently used as a tool to define disputed
terms in the collective bargaining agreement, most usually the term "successor."
[Vol. 44:403
SUCCESSORSHIP DOCTRINE
tial continuity";2 38 the Burns23 9 decision that successors are free not
to hire the employees of the predecessor, but incur a duty to bargain
when they do; and the Howard Johnson 24 suggestion that alternative
remedies may be sought against the seller.
Arbitrators do not, however, rely solely on court cases for prece-
dential doctrine. Although arbitral decisions generally apply only to
the specific facts of a particular grievance, arbitrators frequently refer
to, and interpret, prior arbitrations between other parties.24' This is
particularly evident in arbitrations that concern the obligations of a
predecessor to require a purchaser to assume the existing collective
bargaining agreement.242 In predecessor cases, where the relationship
between the union and the employer has broken down, arbitrators
often cite the same familiar litany of arbitrations as doctrine on which
to rely. Because arbitrators do not always agree on the interpretation
of these prior arbitrations, however, one may surmise that in some
instances the cases are cited merely as a canvas upon which the arbi-
trator can paint his own values or view. Arbitrators also need to legit-
imize their decisions. Thus, they typically attempt to find something
concrete in the unique factual situation before them on which they
238. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
239. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
240. 417 U.S. 249 (1974). There is a related problem of interpreting disputed clauses to
decide who is a successor. If the clauses are truly negotiated, then the union is usually making
some concession in return for greater job security. Yet, a strict reading of Wiley, Burns, and
Howard Johnson enables an employer to avoid liability to the union for his unilateral actions.
The employer, by controlling whether there is "substantial continuity" or whether he hires
employees of the predecessor, also controls whether he is a successor. What then has the
union actually gained in the negotiations?
241. Getman, supra note 171, at 920 n. 18. Although "[t]heoretically, the doctrine of stare
decisis does not apply in labor arbitration .... in fact arbitrators follow precedent at least as
carefully as courts do." Id. Professor Getman believes that precedent serves a useful purpose
in establishing guidelines for management to follow in administering the labor contract. In
addition, the use of precedent serves to reduce grievances and encourages settlement of those
that are filed without the necessity of going to arbitration. Id. at 920. Professor Shulman also
advocates the use of prior arbitrations as a form of precedent and stare decisis. Shulman,
Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REv. 999, 1020 (1955). However,
he conditions this use on interpretation of the same contract between the same parties, that is
"successive decisions within the same enterprise." Id. He states that the use of precedent for
recurring cases within the same enterprises does not mean that a decision affecting United
States Steel should be used by an arbitrator in a General Motors arbitration. Id.
Notwithstanding Professor Shulman's comments, precedent does enable arbitrators to examine
what others have done in similar circumstances, which in the long term should make
arbitration decisions more consistent with one another. See also supra note 113.
242. See Marley-Wylain Co., 87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8293 (1987) (Jacobowski,
Arb.); Wyatt Mfg. Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 153 (1983) (Goodman, Arb.); Martin Podany
Assocs., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 658 (1983) (Gallagher, Arb.); Gallivan's, Inc., 82-2 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) 8411 (1982) (Gallagher, Arb.); Schneier's Finer Foods, Inc., 72 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 881 (1979) (Belkin, Arb.).
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can hang their hats, and their opinions.243 For example, arbitrators
occasionally delve into the collective bargaining history of the par-
ties. 2 " In one particular case, the arbitrator held that a clause lacked
sufficient specificity because the union could not provide historical
support clarifying why a successor clause first appeared in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement some twenty-five years earlier. 245
Arbitrators also consider past practice as an important, though
not controlling, element to be considered in making a decision. 246 For
example, past practice was weighed in determining what could be
posted on a union bulletin board after a successor took control,247
whether a scholarship program for employees' children must con-
tinue,248 whether a successor was required to continue making medi-
cal insurance payments during periods of seasonal layoffs, 249 and
whether a successor was bound to assume a pre-existing collective
bargaining agreement solely because workers' expectations were suffi-
ciently raised by prior takeovers that included assumption of the
243. This is particularly important in those cases where the stakes may be highest:
predecessor cases with the potential for disrupting a sale of a business or an award of damages.
Professor Shulman has commented that an arbitrator's award and opinion must assure the
parties that it is based on reason. Shulman, supra note 241, at 1019. The arbitrator must
demonstrate that he "comprehend[s] the parties' contentions" and that he "informs himself
fully and does not go off half-cocked; and that his final judgment is the product of deliberation
and reason." Id.
244. See, e.g., Universal Mack Sales & Serv., Inc., 86-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8536
(1986) (Chance, Arb.); Allied Employers, Inc., 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 297 (1984) (Armstrong,
Arb.); High Point Sprinkler Co., 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 239 (1976) (Connolly, Arb.); American
Petrofina, Inc., 63 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1300 (1975) (Marlatt, Arb.). However, "offers and
counter-offers made during the process of negotiation are sometimes unsafe guides to the
meaning of the contract." Ahner, Arbitration: A Management Viewpoint, 11 PRoc. NAT'L
ACAD. OF ARB. 76, 84 (1958). Such practice might even hinder the negotiating process by
making the parties afraid that their efforts during negotiations will be held against them in
future arbitrations. Id. at 84-85.
245. See Wyatt, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 153 (1983) (Goodman, Arb.); see also supra note 127
and accompanying text. One can only speculate whether the arbitrator merely was taking a
hard line against the union position or whether he was looking to see if the item actually was
negotiated so that an expectancy was created on the part of the union.
246. Past practice may set up an expectancy of entitlement on the part of one of the parties.
See, e.g., Marley-Wylain, 87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8293 (1987) (Jacobowski, Arb.).
Past practice entitlements can also be set up through clauses negotiated into the contract. See
Goldberg, Management's Reserved Rights: A Labor View, 9 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. 118,
126-27 (1956). Professor Shulman, however, is critical of contract clauses incorporating past
practice, stating that "in many enterprises the execution of a collective agreement would be
blocked if it were insisted that [the contract] contain a broad provision that 'all existing
practices ... shall be continued ... unless changed by mutual consent.' " This is particularly
so because there is commonly a conflicting understanding as to what in fact are the existing
practices. See Shulman, supra note 241, at 1012-13.
247. Maul Technology Corp., 83-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8295 (1983) (Ipavec, Arb.).
248. American Petrofina Co., 65 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 947 (1975) (Stephens, Arb.).
249. Tri-State Asphalt Corp., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 102 (1979) (LeWinter, Arb.).
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contract.25°
In Burns,2 51 the Supreme Court noted that harsh restrictions on
successor companies might discourage purchasers and inhibit the
transfer of capital.2 52 Although one might suspect that this logic is
pervasive in arbitrations, it actually is not. Arbitrators seldom discuss
economic theory. Nevertheless, at least one arbitrator has acknowl-
edged that "it is an economic fact of life today that great flexibility in
the ownership of industry has been recognized as a necessity to sur-
vive in a nightmare of soaring inflation, scarce capital, and capricious
taxation, considerations that never vexed Andrew Carnegie or John
D. Rockefeller. ' ' 25 3  In another instance, an arbitrator termed the
notion of preventing a predecessor from selling a business unless the
purchaser agreed to be bound by a collective bargaining agreement a
"fascinating theory," and warned that it would grant an enormous
economic arsenal to unions.2 54
The "free transfer of capital" rationale is closely related to the
"management rights" and "economic efficiency" arguments.
Although not explicitly stated, the doctrine of "management rights"
underlies arbitrations in which the union has the burden of showing
clear and convincing evidence to sustain its grievance.2 55 This place-
250. Marley-Wylain Co., 87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8293 (1987) (Jacobowski, Arb.).
251. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
252. Id. at 288.
253. American Petrofina, Inc., 63 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1300, 1306-07 (1975) (Marlatt, Arb.)
(union waived potential rights to severance pay potentially due from predecessor in exchange
for successor's assumption of contract and certain obligations of seniority).
Actually, it may not be surprising that arbitrators rarely discuss capital mobility. One can
posit that if the underlying premise, that any infringement on capital mobility interferes with
the potential restructuring of a business, is taken as true, then there is no need to discuss it.
The importance of capital mobility thereby becomes an unstated assumption informing
arbitrators' decisions. Professor Silverstein similarly notes that very few commentators even
bother to analyze the claim concerning capital mobility. Silverstein, supra note 1, at 174 n.81.
254. Wyatt Mfg. Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 153, 161 (1983) (Goodman, Arb.). Wyatt is a
pointed example of how values concerning the free flow of capital inform the manner in which
an arbitrator approaches a successor clause. But see Marley-Wylain Co., 87-1 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) 8293, at 4262 (1987) (Jacobowski, Arb.), (noting that there was mutual
benefit to both the union and the employer because of successor language in the collective
bargaining agreement). The ultimate question concerning successor language in a contract is
whether a union could effectively bargain for a contract clause setting out the remedy for the
employer's failure to obtain assumption of the contract or hiring of the employees by a
purchaser. But see Irving, supra note 163.
The potential of any successorship clause to cause havoc to a seller is clear. See, e.g.,
Local Lodge No. 1266, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276 (7th Cir.
1981). In Panoramic, a sale of a company was enjoined pending arbitration. "Although the
company ultimately prevailed in arbitration," the sale fell through because of the delays
entailed by the litigation and arbitration. Miller & Lindsay, Mergers and Acquisitions. Labor
Relations Considerations, 9 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 427, 440 (1983).
255. See Gallivan's, Inc., 82-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8411 (1982) (Gallagher, Arb.).
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ment of the burden is based on an acceptance that the rights of man-
agement pre-date the existence of the union or the collective
bargaining negotiations. 6 The union's rights are therefore limited to
those that have been relinquished by management,257 and the union
must show that the rights it claims to possess actually have been won
at the negotiating table.
V. CONCLUSION
Successorship arbitrations fall into two general categories: arbi-
trations against predecessor companies and those against successors.
An analysis of arbitral decisions reveals that arbitrators approach
these categories differently. Judicially created doctrine plays an
important role in defining this difference. The first issue in a predeces-
sor arbitration often is whether a purchasing or merging company
actually is a "successor." In making this determination, arbitrators
tend to rely on the public law doctrine reflected in Wiley, Burns, and
Howard Johnson. In contrast, successor arbitrations rely less fre-
quently on these cases because usually there already has been a deter-
mination or admission that the succeeding company is a successor.
Although expositions on economic theory and the free transfer of
capital are rarely seen in arbitration opinions, it is possible to detect
hints of such views in predecessor arbitrations, rather than in succes-
sor arbitrations. This is not surprising, however, because only prede-
cessor arbitrations entail the possible interference with the sale that
makes transfer of capital theories relevant. These large monetary
issues may occasion the loss of a business opportunity or the payment
of substantial damages. The underlying and unstated assumption is
that capital mobility is necessary to ensure entrepreneurial flexibility.
Thus, with the unstated assumption as background, arbitrators often
require explicit language or circumstances before enforcing a succes-
sorship clause in a predecessor arbitration.
Capital mobility considerations are less important in successor
arbitrations. Monetary issues often give way to common sense. The
potential costs that may be incurred by the successor as a result of an
arbitrator's decision are likely to be minimal in relation to the cost of
the purchase of the enterprise. Such costs, therefore, are not determi-
256. Gross, Value Judgments in the Decisions of Labor Arbitrators, 21 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 55, 58 (1967). For a general discussion of management rights from opposing
perspectives, see Phelps, Management's Reserved Rights: An Industry View, 9 PROC. NAT'L
ACAD. OF ARB. 102 (1956), and Goldberg, supra note 246.
257. This view requires that an arbitrator interpret a contractual silence in favor of
management. Therefore, the union can only arbitrate violations of explicit contractual
provisions. Stone, supra note 3, at 1549.
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native in whether or not the purchase or investment is made. Succes-
sor arbitrations more closely resemble the traditional model of labor
arbitration as contract interpretation, focused on concrete issues such
as seniority or recall rights. The grievance often may affect only one
or two workers, and the real parties to the dispute, the employer and
the union, generally understand that they must continue to have a
relationship. Consequently, the need is merely to clean up the sale or
merger transaction, and fill in contractual gaps or redefine certain
terms in the context of the new relationship. Arbitrators also under-
stand the dynamics of this ongoing relationship, and are more com-
fortable in resolving these disputes than they are in predecessor
arbitrations, in which the relationship between the union and the
employer has broken down or ended. Thus, in successor arbitrations,
the arbitrator may fashion a remedy that neither party is happy with,
but that ultimately is acceptable to both.
The viability of arbitration as a dispute resolution process ulti-
mately rests on a perception of fairness. Obviously, the parties' com-
pliance with a decision depends to some extent on it being viewed as
fair. Arbitrators, many of whom earn a significant income from arbi-
tration, also depend upon this perception, as they cannot hope to be
chosen again as arbitrators if their decisions are not perceived as fair
and reasonable.25 In order to reinforce the perception of fairness, an
arbitrator may cite Supreme Court doctrine, prior arbitrations, the
negotiating history and past practice of the parties, or even an eco-
nomic theory as the basis for his opinion. Although arbitrators may
differ to some extent in their interpretations of prior court cases or
arbitrations, they generally are consistent in attempting to ground
their decisions within narrowly defined principles and rationales.
They may not be arbitrary, or appear to be arbitrary. "In the last
analysis, what is sought [from arbitrators] is a wise judgment." 259
Given the limitations of arbitration as a dispute resolution process
bounded by a collective bargaining agreement, the specific facts of an
employer-employee conflict, and, in some instances, public law doc-
trine, such a judgment is usually received.
JEFFREY M. LANDAU
258. See P. HAYS, supra note 171, at 60-61, 112.
259. Shulman, supra note 242, at 1016.
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